British military police, outskirts of Kabul.

The Evolution of
Peace Operations Doctrine

By RICHARD B. LOVELOCK

Transforming Kosovo is a multifaceted challenge requiring a comprehensive and incremental response. Political, security, legal, and economic issues must be addressed as a coordinated whole to ensure a durable peace. Thus the military contribution must be integrated within the overall framework. Lessons can be drawn from both existing doctrine and previous operations, particularly from successful counterinsurgency efforts. Capable warfighting forces must operate among the people, using the guidelines provided by maneuverist doctrine and adapted to local conditions to enable the military, in cooperation with the police, to find (locate), fix (control or shape), and then strike at the sources of the security problem.

The following analysis centers on approaches adopted after the 1999 Kosovo intervention and includes relevant experiences. Its intent is to combine historical and contemporary approaches, offer lessons, and demonstrate that the military

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community has already gone beyond current doctrinal guidelines in some areas. It concludes by calling for new doctrine to prepare forces for operations similar to the Kosovo conflict in a complex multinational environment. The aim is to ensure that tactical activity by deployed forces leads to a meaningful strategic result.

The Challenge

International involvement in Kosovo represents the top end of such intervention because it draws on many resources. U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 is unambiguous in setting out a list of tasks; First World militaries are engaged; and there is a relatively well resourced and structured U.N. mission, a reasonably sophisticated infrastructure, heavy development and investment from nongovernmental organizations, and a resourceful population with a large and supportive Diaspora.

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Yet serious problems confront these resources. The diversity of actors poses a coordination challenge. The absence of a final political status for the province further complicates matters. The security situation features violence inspired by ethnic tension, political extremism, and organized crime. Major General R.A. Fry, a former commander, Multinational Brigade (Centre) (MNB(C)), has described a "profoundly revisionist nexus which comprises crime, paramilitary, and extremist political organizations, each indivisible from the other . . . individuals coalescing together opportunistically in pursuit of local advantage [which] naturally feeds on the Albanian parallel structures."[1] This environment challenges both military and police elements.

British and American officers in Kabul.

AP/Wide World Photo (Brennan Linsley)

Maintaining a multiethnic society is a daunting challenge, and a goal of the international security presence is to ensure that the remaining Serb, Roma, and other minorities are not forced to live under the apartheid system that existed before NATO intervention. Equally, if the ambitions of Kosovar Albanians for some form of independence are not realized, the

key elements are in place for the international community to become the target of the same activities the Serbs faced earlier. Deep undercurrents of instability remain despite peaceful elections. Action is needed in the security domain to transform the situation and move the process forward. Such efforts can reduce the threat that international contributions will be targeted and the danger that they will be destabilized.

The Response

To repeat, the security challenge calls for combat-ready forces capable of operating among the people. As one observer has noted, "peacekeeping is anything but an activity for wimps."[2] Forces tasked to participate must be ready for the full spectrum of operations. Preparedness for combat will enhance credibility and effectiveness and so reduce the need to actually use force. With troops coming from the warfighting armory, the first key point is that an army can only operate with one generic doctrine, and any guidelines for peace support operations must be firmly rooted in warfighting doctrine. Peace support doctrine should merely provide guidance on operating in that particular environment.

Warfighting doctrine is already well defined and is based on the maneuverist approach and its key enabler—mission command, or mission tactics. This technique is ideal for peace support because it seeks to disrupt the opponent's overall cohesion and will to fight. The new NATO peace support operations doctrine, AJP-3.4.1, makes that point.

The military needs an approach that accepts chaos and disorder, the very characteristics inherent in peace support operations, and turns them to advantage. They must seek to gain, and maintain, a position of advantage with which to influence the will and cohesion of opponents or parties.

This language is remarkably similar to that used for warfighting. The maneuverist approach can help commanders see alternatives to direct attacks and attrition, which are usually inappropriate in an environment where the imperative is to promote consent through impartial actions and, while being ready for combat, by applying the minimum force necessary. Thus the second key point is that commanders must seek to influence the will or cohesion of the parties—indeed of the public as a whole—and in this environment military forces must operate among the populace.

The mission command (mission tactics) philosophy is a widely understood aspect of Western doctrine and is the principal enabler for the maneuverist approach. It is also ideally suited to the fluid and sensitive aspects of peace support operations. Decentralized control is the order of the

British army medics in
Afghanistan.

day. When commanders on all levels understand their general roles and specific tasks with their underlying purposes, they are more able to think laterally and share objectives through unity of effort, decentralization, trust, understanding, and timely decisionmaking. Nevertheless, it is often argued that mission command is not valid because political considerations make themselves felt on the lowest levels and thus constrain tactical initiative. In fact, the reverse is often true. Some issues pertaining to relationships and coordination call for close control, but there will also be a need to seize fleeting opportunities and react purposefully under pressure, often in the media spotlight.

A third aspect of warfighting doctrine is what the British army terms the *core functions* of combat. According to JWP 3-50:

At its simplest there are two: to shape and control the operational environment so as to more ably accomplish the mission; and the direct application of military techniques to achieve resolution and the accomplishment of the mission . . . described respectively as fixing and striking. Implicit in both is the need for

good intelligence to find and identify the causes of the problem.

Thus the core functions of *find*, *fix*, and *strike* are derived. These have a central role in peace support operations and are rooted in experience.

The Lessons

The British experience with counterinsurgency operations is worthy of examination from two perspectives, the first strategic and leading to a key point: a comprehensive response strategy was employed, involving coordinated activities across government agencies and departments. Secondly, from a more tactical perspective but reinforcing the strategic, these operations were conducted amongst the people they were designed to impact. Additionally, a number of techniques common to the warfighting model fall from this experience. They include a maneuverist approach and, critically, intelligence-led operations in cooperation with the police to find, shape, and then strike at the sources of the security problem.

Guarding suspected Serb headquarters, Pristina.

In counterinsurgency, the broader context, political scenario, and legal aspects differ from peace support operations. However, the complex situation and the predominantly human dimension lead to strong similarities between the operational concepts and responses.

Whilst there is no antidote to insurgency, and pragmatism has been the key to the British approach, a central principle has been obtaining

political leaders were coopted to familiarize the populace with the resolution of the problem

unity of effort through overall coordination in order to generate a comprehensive response. The preferred method was to appoint a director of operations to chair an operations committee, which included the heads of the military, the police, the administration, intelligence, and psychological operations. Once circumstances permitted, local political and other leaders were coopted to familiarize the populace with the resolution of the problem. Similar committees are being employed in Kosovo.

The key factor again emerged in analysis of earlier counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus that "It is in men's minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided."[3] In such circumstances it is imperative to develop intelligence to prosecute operations. "The main problem in fighting insurgents lies in finding them. . . . In most . . . campaigns the main burden for developing background information falls on the normal military units."[4] This was the beginning of today's intelligence-led operations.

Another key point emerges. Obtaining intelligence from operating amongst the population enables specifically targeted operations which need fewer troops than a more random or attritionalist approach. For example, the army and police cooperated in patrolling and guarding in Malaya. Often termed framework operations, these activities were necessary to limit freedom of movement and shape the environment—or *fix* the insurgents. Troops and police were obtaining the information from the populace to find the insurgents in order to plan strikes to remove them. Here the core functions of finding, fixing, and striking emerge fully in the counterinsurgency context.

The United Kingdom employed the broad themes of the counterinsurgency concept for fighting terrorism in Northern Ireland. A committee structure directed activities on the operational level, and framework operations provided the essential backdrop for intelligence-led strikes against the terrorists on the tactical level. The pattern of operations was similar and the methodology of find, fix, and strike was applied again.

Another key feature has been extensive cooperation with the police on all levels. This has involved joint planning, joint operations rooms, and joint patrolling and operations. The focus for the military has been on supporting the police by bringing capabilities to the table that a police force normally lacks. Critical to this partnership is understanding that the police and military are different, leading to the next key point—the importance of the police-military relationship in providing a secure environment.

The value of using such an approach for counterinsurgency and contemporary problems has been recognized. General Sir Michael Jackson, the first commander of Kosovo Force (COMKFOR), remarked in an address that on entry to Kosovo on June 12, 1999, the situation was anarchic. He told a U.K. battalion commander to imagine Belfast in the early days of "the troubles" to understand Pristina. "It is a mixture of a firm hand but appreciating that it is not a war—the battleground is in peoples' minds, and therefore how do you engage with that?"

American academic Tom Mockaitis has examined both counterinsurgency and peace operations, pointing out that Britain's technique:

contains much to inform the conduct of peace operations to end civil conflict. . . . The most striking feature of British counterinsurgency has been its unified

Warrior tanks in Macedonia.

approach: soldiers, police, and civil administrators worked together to provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of civil unrest. Soldiers provided the shield behind which civilians could rebuild a war-torn country from within.[5]

The Kosovo Approach

The experience of Kosovo suggests that the comprehensive approach applied in the counterinsurgency model is also fundamental to contemporary peace support operations. The military role is to provide secure conditions for other actors to create a durable peace. These efforts cannot occur in isolation. An overall transformation is necessary to take a society from a negative peace, imposed by military force and not amounting to much more than stopping the shooting, towards a positive peace. This involves changing human conditions so peace can be self-sustaining until all conflict can be managed nonviolently. An enduring lesson of the post-Dayton experience in Bosnia is that it is no longer logical to separate military and civilian functions, and UNSCR 1244 has specifically precluded it. The security elements must address the symptoms of the violence from the outset by deterring and if necessary physically preventing or containing it. Concurrently, the underlying enablers of violent conflict need to be attacked through a coordinated political, security, and economic strategy, using the whole range of international capabilities.

The absence of a final political status for Kosovo has caused military challenges in the campaign planning domain. Conventional doctrinal and political wisdom require an endstate to facilitate such planning and shape the context for military involvement. But this philosophy may now be counterproductive in the long run. As Jackson explained, "Uncertainty is absolutely part of a soldier's job; not only should we not resent it but we should learn to embrace it."[6] Whilst the conditions for deploying troops must be spelt out, it must also be clear that the force will contribute to a durable peace in the medium term and will thus enable political solutions in the medium to long term. So in the absence of direction from above, commanders on the spot have effectively developed their own interim endstate—a relatively simple statement of the conditions necessary to move towards a durable peace or simply an improved environment.

Political direction is key to developing an interim endstate and must often be viewed in terms of the art of the possible. Here the *supporting* and *supported* analogy of conventional military doctrine is helpful. This relationship is mandated in Kosovo by UNSCR 1244 and essentially sees Kosovo Force (KFOR) supporting the U.N. mission. Relationships change as solutions emerge in the transformation process, but the clear imperative is to erase distinctions between military and

civilian objectives. Employing a committee structure on all levels goes far towards making them civil-military objectives.

With an interim endstate established, the lines of operation (or functional activities) in the campaign plan can be worked backwards. These guide what various actors must do to achieve the *decisive points* to attack the center of gravity and so attain the endstate. A combination of sequenced activities by both military and civilian actors is needed to achieve the effect required of each line of operation. No single actor can deliver all the decisive points to establish law and order, for example. Jackson provided an analogy of "weaving the strands of a rope." Campaign planning can be conducted despite the absence of a traditional endstate so that incremental progress can be achieved. This process must take in all relevant actors, not just the military. The many agencies involved—the strands—must be woven into a rope, the comprehensive response. This rope of activity will be stronger than the individual strands.

A campaign plan which employed warfighting doctrine had evolved by 2000. The U.K.-led MNB(C) in Kosovo saw the interim endstate as achieving the political objective of creating conditions for permanent peaceful political dialogue within the province. The goal was to be reached through attacking the center of gravity of the Serbian/Kosovar Albanians. Lines of operation were developed to synchronize the use of military force in support of political ends.

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There are two dimensions to understanding the chosen center of gravity: an enemy's physical means (military capability) to use violence and its moral means (willingness) to use it. Although the consent of all the majorities arguably existed, the problem when attacking the center of gravity was the growing difficulty of identifying the truly hard line elements in both dimensions. In practical terms, the concept was for MNB(C) to use intelligence offensively to concentrate activities (security, information operations, and civil-military effort) in time and space in order to affect the parties' willingness to use violence.

The Immediate and the Distant

Such operations as the above are based on a conceptual framework with deep and close dimensions, as specified in existing doctrine. Close operations, usually conducted on the battalion level, are used to maintain contact with the population and set the conditions for deep operations, which aim to achieve decisive effect on the center of gravity and are usually controlled on

brigade level and involve more specialist troops and techniques. Critically, all activities are conducted in close cooperation with the police.

Close operations are designed to manage and control the immediate operational environment. This helps ensure compliance with the mandate and promote general consent. It can involve strike, but the emphasis is on the core functions of find and fix. Such activity forms much of the daily pattern of visible operations for most of the troops deployed.

Deep operations are designed to decisively affect the center of gravity. This is accomplished by precluding certain events or influencing public perceptions. Thus it sets the conditions for political resolution. The emphasis is on activities designed to find and strike, which shows the practical application of a maneuverist approach.

Strike in this context has involved targeted and surgical operations, including cordon and search to seize arms and illegal materials, targeted arrests, interdiction of trafficking routes, disruption of training bases, and dislocation of communications. But it also includes influencing the will of the parties and the people, so information operations are vital. Strike activities can be to the physical or financial disadvantage of "spoilers," who may react violently or generate public disquiet, a factor to be considered during planning. Confidence must be built by separating the populace from the past and creating a climate of hope. Public concerns about a foreign security presence must be addressed. Additional means of striking lie outside the military domain but may increase security through humanitarian or socioeconomic efforts.

Information operations overlay all other activities and are the principal fires available to commanders. They magnify police and military team efforts by getting truthful information to target audiences in and out of theater. The will of the population can also be influenced by providing a carrot such as assistance or aid to mollify the effects of the stick.

Filling in the Gaps

The above methodology has been employed in Kosovo with increasing success; however, gaps still hamper a comprehensive response. While these approaches are based on doctrine and have been developed from experience, operational techniques have now gone beyond current doctrine, particularly in the spheres of planning without an endstate and operations in conjunction with the police. Security activities demand robust political decisionmaking both in and out

British troops in Portadown, Northern Ireland.

AP/Wide World Photo (Peter Morrison)

of theater. Risk is implicit if the political intent is to have an impact in the short to medium term even in the absence of a final decision on status. That said, multinationality cannot be ignored, particularly in the military arena. It is only natural that governments should provide military contingents with political instructions since deploying force is a means of operationalizing political intent.

Multinationality can lead to incoherence on the theater level because the overall commander may have difficulty reaching consensus on a given course of action. Nevertheless, increased exploitation of the maneuverist approach, with emphasis on deep operations, is needed for KFOR to play its full part in generating a durable peace. The alternative is to remain in a holding pattern, a form of containment which would fix KFOR through its own volition rather than striking deep at the problem from a province-wide perspective. In such circumstances, multinational brigades would likely continue to operate as semidetached entities with little opportunity to exercise overall control by COMKFOR.

Operations in the Balkans and elsewhere have provided a raft of experience that must be captured. Kosovo represents the state of the art, particularly in police-military operations and the need to conduct intelligence-led operations among the populace. New doctrine should emphasize a comprehensive response and the interdependence of the political, security, legal, and economic elements together with the requirement for incremental planning as the situation evolves. This will improve the military ability to work with civilian organizations and deal with lack of political direction. The commander's role in a comprehensive response requires a grasp of issues well beyond the purely military.

Modern war demands the holistic approach developed elsewhere. Although primarily couched in the language of peace support operations, all the above recommendations are relevant to the challenge of the war on global terrorism. **JFQ**

NOTES

[1] R.A. Fry, "A View from Kosovo," *RUSI Journal,* vol. 146, no. 3 (June 2001), p. 13.

[2] Christopher Bellamy, "Combining Combat Readiness with Compassion," *NATO Review*, vol. 49, no. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 9–11.

[3] Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 31.

[4] Ibid., p. 99.

[5] Tom Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch?* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), p. 134.

[6] Mike Jackson, "KFOR: The Inside Story," *RUSI Journal,* vol. 145, no. 1 (February 2000), p. 14.